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British physicist Arthur Eddington proved Einstein's theory of relativity. Or so he claimed. Courtesy AIP, Emilio Segrč Visual Archives.
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matter of degree How do scientists resolve problems? By experiment and argument, generally. But by definition, experiments at the edges of science are difficult (otherwise somebody would already have done them), and subject to differing interpretations. The scientists and technicians who can pull off ultra-precise measurements, Pinch says, are said to have a "golden hand." Because their clever techniques often cannot be fully described in scientific journals, scientists intent on repeating an experiment may sometimes visit colleagues for training.
Edifying story Take, for example, the famous 1919 test by British physicist Arthur Eddington, of Einstein's prediction that gravity bends light. Eddington wanted to track starlight passing near the sun, and he used the sun's approximate mass to calculate the deflection predicted by Einstein. Let's look at the experimental situation:
Faced with these complications, it's perhaps not surprising that Eddington's two expeditions returned with some data that confirmed Einstein -- and data that confirmed Newton. Albert Einstein was a patent office drone when he grasped that gravity would bend light waves. He didn't figure out how to test his theory... Courtesy W. F. Meggers Gallery of Nobel Laureates, AIP, Emilio Segrč Visual Archives. Right, right? After looking at other experiments at the frontier of science, Pinch describes them as similar to Eddington's Einsteinian edification. "They are difficult, demanding, they have a small signal, it's quite near the noise level, and when you repeat the experiment, you often don't find the same thing." When, as in the case recounted, the data do not agree, Pinch asks, "who screwed up? Maybe both groups, maybe one or the other." For more refutation of the stereotyped, "to do science, just do an experiment" paradigm, Collins and Pinch recount Louis Pasteur's debunking of spontaneous generation, the 19th century view that life did not necessarily descend from other life. In these experiments, Pasteur sterilized a closed container with heat, and the gook inside was not decayed by microbes. But his results were murky, and luck played a larger role than popular histories recount. Experimenter beware Think of following a new recipe, Pinch says. "Suppose you watch a cook on TV making a fancy recipe... and when you try it at home, all those exotic mushrooms turn to mush. You're faced with dilemma in principle like an experimenter at the research frontier." Did the TV chef cut a corner? Are you too clumsy? From the evidence at hand, it's impossible to know what went wrong. At this point, social factors like trust, reputation and experience may enter the picture. "You can say the TV chef is much more skilled... or it could go the other way," Pinch says. "You could say you're a darn good cook, maybe this recipe doesn't work, maybe the TV chef cheated." This culinary example demonstrates what Pinch and Collins call "experimenter's regress." When the data conflict, what do you believe? Prestige, certainly, plays a major role: as any scientist knows, papers from well-regarded researchers and well-known institutions get taken more seriously -- whether or not they are more accurate or inherently important. And as the Eddington example illustrates, even expectations can play a role when the scientific field is wide open. Finally, for better or worse, articles in highly regarded journals, like Science and Nature, are accorded unusual respect and validity. History, Pinch argues, shows that science is not a purified, hyper-logical pursuit, but rather a form of human expertise that's subject to some of the same limitations affecting other areas of expertise.
Only in it for the money? She points to biotech (the realm of the GM corn controversy) as a place where money and patents threaten the free flow of information on which science depends. "A lot of scientists have intimate consulting arrangements with private industry, or have created their own companies," she says. "Now there are all kinds of complicated problems. If I'm doing research in the lab, and have a company, will I publish all the details if it's patentable? Do I encourage grad students to publish if it's patentable? There's a direct conflict with open exchange of information, which is critical to evaluating the legitimacy of work." Secrecy also threatens the essential "peer review" process, which precedes publication in most reputable science journals. Editors send manuscripts to experts for comments, criticism and anonymous hazing (scientists can be quite direct). If the authors revise the article adequately after the review, the article is published. Articles that fail peer review are rejected.
To Pinch, Nature's disowning-but-not-retracting of the article "is tantamount to acknowledging that something went wrong with the peer review process. It's kind of having things both ways -- backing both horses." In fact, Oreskes claims that much of the review process "is perfunctory today. Almost every scientist can give examples of completely preposterous things that came out in their area. It's almost impossible to get a reviewer who will check math or review a computer model, check the code ... you're almost asking somebody to do the work all over again." Testing, testing In practice, however, there's no glory in saying "Look at me! I found the same durn thing!" so, as Collins has pointed out, exact replication is rare. However, doing something similar may get you published, and therefore be worthwhile, notes Oreskes, "So replication is a kind of complicated morphing from A to B to C. That's often productive, but it creates problems because it could be the case that the original phenomenon was false, but you never really test it." I see somebody looking over your shoulder.
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